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The state of democracy in the Global South is marked by a striking 
paradox: while liberal democracy has attained an ideologically hegemonic 
position through two so-called waves of democracy, the qualities of such 
democracies is increasingly called into question. The ”old” democracies in 
the global South like Sri Lanka are weakened. Democracy defi cits have 
emerged within constitutional and institutional arrangements as well 
as in political practices. Further, the ”third wave of democracy” is over. 
”New” democracies like Indonesia have fostered freedoms, privatisation 
and decentralisation but continue to suffer from poor governance, 
representation and participation. Hence there are general signs of decline. 
Vulnerable people are frustrated with lack of actual infl uence and sustained 
elitism. Politicians winning elections often need to foster ethnic and 
religious loyalties, clientelism and the abuse of public resources. Powerful 
groups and middle classes with poor ability to win elections tend to opt for 
privatisation and return partially to authoritarian governance. 
 Critical questions are therefore asked about the feasibility of 
democracy in developing country contexts. Some observers say it is only 
a problem of better crafting of institutions. Others contend that ”full” 
democratisation was premature in the fi rst place and that necessary 
preconditions need to be created beforehand. This article argues that both 
positions are based on a narrow and static understanding of democracy. 
While the core elements of democracy are universal, real world democracies 
develop (or decline) over time and through contextual dynamics; in processes 
and contexts of actors, institutions and relations of power. Therefore, 
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the crucial task is to analyse the problems and options of expanding the 
historically “early” freedoms and defi cient elements of democracy that 
fortunately exist in spite of poor socio-economic and political conditions 
in countries such as Sri Lanka and Indonesia rather than giving up on 
these freedoms until the other conditions have somehow improved. This 
is to advance towards the universally accepted aim of democracy in terms 
of popular control of public affairs on the basis of political equality; and 
to be able to use democracy to handle confl icts and alter unequal and 
unsustainable development. 
With this in mind, researchers at the Universities of Oslo (Norway), 
Gadjah Mada (Indonesia) and Colombo (Sri Lanka) have come together in a 
collective research- and post-graduate programme. The idea is to pool their 
research projects and results, and to promote doctoral as well as master 
studies by way of, fi rst, a joint framework for analysing power, confl ict and 
democracy and, second, a basic electronic peer reviewed journal and report 
series (published by PCD-Press) to the benefi t of students, scholars and 
priorities in the region. Basic resources - in addition to the participants 
own voluntary work and projects - are provided by their respective 
universities and the Norwegian Centre for International Cooperation in 
Higher Education (SIU). 
This initiative is very much open for similarly oriented scholars and 
institutions that wish to share resources, capacities and aspirations within 
the fi eld.1 In fact, the main aim of this fi rst issue of the PCD Journal is to 
present our points of departure and ongoing research in order to stimulate 
contact, co-operation and wider discussion. Inquiries to the participating 
researchers and submissions to forthcoming issues of this electronic PCD 
Journal are most welcome. Prospective contributors are invited to contact 
the editors for further information and dialog about potential contributions.
 Having detailed the points of departure, this article is followed 
by a presentation by Olle Törnquist of our analytical framework and a 
series of articles on the major priorities of the research. Two articles 
summarise what we know and what remains to fi nd out about the over-all 
standard and dynamics of democracy in Indonesia and Sri Lanka. In the 
fi rst case Willy Samadhi and Nicolaas Warouw draw on Demos’ national 
expert surveys in 2003-04 and 2007 (Priyono et.al. 2007; Demos 2008). In 
the second case, Jayadeva Uyangoda consults relevant parts of the report 
on the state of democracy in South Asia, co-ordinated by the Delhi based 
Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (2007), and adds insights 
from local surveys and case studies. Within these general contexts, project 
leaders discuss then the state of knowledge and present the key themes and 
specifi c problems that are being addressed within the programme. In the 
context of Indonesia, Aris Mundayat and Budi Irawanto discuss democratic 
Governmentality; Pratikno and Nanang Indra Kurniawan focus on the 
problem of democratic representation; Mohtar Mas’oed and Pitra Narendra 
focus on political fi nancing; and Muhadi Sugiono and Fransiskus A Jalong 
discuss Indonesian confl ict resolution.  In the Sri Lankan framework, 
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a comprehensive review by Jayadeva Uyangoda of relevant research is 
followed by presentations of a number of major problems that call for further 
studies. Laksiri Fernando discusses relations between capital and labour 
and new trade union politics; Janaki Jayawardena focuses on women in 
electoral politics; Premakumara de Silva addresses the issue of religion 
and grounded democracy; and Nirmal Ranjith Devasiro discusses radical 
politics, economic liberalisation and ethnic confl icts. Finally, Kristian 
Stokke (with Olle Törnquist and Gyda Sindre) discusses crucial issues and 
emerging results about confl ict resolution in the aftermath on the 2004 
tsunami in Aceh (Indonesia) and Sri Lanka. Additional research within 
the programme, including a number of PhD projects, will be presented in 
forthcoming issues of the PCD Journal. 
It is important to underline once again, that the outlines of our 
analytical framework and thematic research are put forward for open 
discussion and to hopefully attract wider co-operation.
Problematic paths towards democracy
Historically, there are two paths towards democracy in the South.2 
The fi rst path (which dominated until the mid-1960s and which was part 
of the so-called second world wide wave of democracy) is associated with 
the struggle for state sovereignty and citizenship against colonialism and 
feudal-like subordination of people. The basic argument was about the need 
for social, economic and political modernisation. This called for structural 
change through, some said, the expansion of market-based capitalism, 
or, others said, state directed markets or even socialism. One debate 
was about what classes and groups that would be interested and able to 
propel what strategies and reforms such as redistribution of land. Another 
debate was whether and how democracy was a realistic political project 
given the defi cit of structural preconditions. While Latin America provided 
early examples of transitions to independence and democracy, Asia and 
Africa came after World War II. In Asia, the main focus of our programme, 
only a few countries managed to sustain basic elements of the fi rst path 
to democracy, primarily India and Sri Lanka (the similar dynamics in 
South Korea and Taiwan was later). Most other countries deteriorated into 
authoritarian or dictatorial rule, including the Philippines under Marcos 
and Indonesia under “guided democracy” towards the end of Sukarno’s 
reign and later during Suharto’s “new order”. Leaders like Marcos and 
Suharto thus joined the counterparts in for instance Singapore, Vietnam 
and China who still say that the conditions are not yet ripe for whatever 
democracy they claim to be in favour of.
The second path to democracy in the global South is associated 
with the countries and peoples that did not make it in the fi rst round or 
backslided into authoritarian or even dictatorial rule, including Suharto’s 
Indonesia. This second path differs sharply from the fi rst. In Asia, the fi rst 
route was mainly during the Cold War and focused on nation building, 
modernisation, structural preconditions and social forces (such as the 
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“national bourgeoisie”, anti-feudal peasants, and the growing middle- and 
working classes) and on political and military leaders drawing on them. By 
contrast, the second path was rather towards the end of the Cold War and 
after. In the world at large it was associated with the so-called third wave 
of democracy. Initially (by the early 1980s) this wave spread to the global 
South via Portugal and Spain to Latin America. Later on it also affected 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Soviet bloc. In the Middle East, 
however, the dynamics was stalled; and further to the East the processes 
were late and mainly limited to the Philippines, Thailand, and, fi nally, 
Indonesia. 
In the Global South, the second path (or third wave) was usually 
based on the crisis of authoritarian regimes, the generally felt need among 
dissidents to foster basic human rights, the rare inability of popularly rooted 
forces to present a strong alternative (with the major exception of South 
Africa), and the strong interest among international actors in promoting 
global liberalisation, including by way of agreements among sympathetic 
“moderate” sections of the local elites. The transitions were thus more 
about elitist designing of minimum democratic institutions than additional 
institutions, popular capacities and policies to promote the structural 
conditions and relations of power that had hitherto been deemed crucial 
for genuine democratic development. Typically, the incumbents among 
these elites gave up authoritarianism as long as they could privatise and 
legalise decades of accumulation of capital through political monopolies 
and coercive instruments of power, so-called primitive accumulation of 
capital. In return, the dissidents agreed to constrain popular participation 
and radical change, as long as there were agreement (at least on paper) 
on basic liberties, human rights and certain elements of democracy. 
The common scholarly and political argument was that once the right 
institutions were in place with regard to justice, basic rights, elections, 
“good governance”, freedom of media and civic participation, democracy 
would fl ourish. It would also prevent and help resolving social, ethnic and 
regional confl icts.
Explaining the crisis of democratisation3
There is now an emerging consensus on the state of political 
development in the global South. The third wave of democracy has come to 
an end and the second path is undermined. Fortunately, several civil and 
political rights (including technically free and fair elections, dynamic media 
and associational life) have remained important in a few “old” democracies 
such as India and Sri Lanka, and have gained vital ground in a number of 
the new ones. Yet, these freedoms have not been accompanied by effi cient 
reforms to improve social and economic rights and the institutional 
mechanisms to pursue equity in access to justice, the rule of law, and 
‘good governance’.4 In-spite of positive statements it is rather the old 
ideas of the primacy of “strong institutions” and “fi rm guidance” that are 
currently returning to the forefront (e.g. Abrahamsen 2000; Grugel 2002; 
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Ottaway 2003; Carothers 2004; Carothers et.al 2007; CSDS 2007; Priyono 
et.al. 2007).
Three main explanations have been offered for these democratic 
defi cits. The fi rst suggestion is that it is not a failure of the model of 
democratisation as such but of its implementation (e.g. World Bank 1997 
and UNDP 2002). For example, inadequate resources have been applied 
to get the procedures of electoral politics up and running. Currently 
there is a special interest in better crafting of party systems so that they 
become “functional” in accordance with classical top-down parliamentary 
principles. Meanwhile popular political representation based on ideology 
and interests is deemed idealistic (e.g. IDEA 2007).  
The second and radically different explanation is that the problem 
is less about design than insuffi cient conditions for liberal democracies, 
narrowly defi ned in terms of freedoms and fair elections. Currently one 
core argument is that the freedoms and elections tend to be “abused”. 
This may even generate more corruption and violent confl icts (World Bank 
1997, Paris 2004, Mansfi eld and Snyder 2005). Hence it is argued that 
democracy needs to be “sequenced”. Popular control should be held back 
until unspecifi ed elites have created the necessary conditions (Carothers 
2007a and 2007b).  Such conditions include a liberal state based on the 
rule of law, “good governance” and civil societies. While leftist theses about 
the need for revolutions have largely faded away, the classical argument 
among modernisation theorists about the need for economic growth to gain 
more public resources and middle classes - as in the idealised view of 
European history - is also added. The only alternative in this respect seems 
to be the experiences from the authoritarian developmental states and 
China, or more generally (with Khan 2005) to somehow foster progressive 
growth coalitions.  In many ways this cluster of arguments resembles 
Samuel Huntington’s (1965) old thesis from the cold war about the need 
for “politics of order” to enforce and institutionalise middle class rule as 
an alternative to statist rule – a thesis that paved the way for decades of 
authoritarianism. 
The third explanation and the major point of departure for this 
research programme is based on the argument that the development 
of democracy has been depoliticised (Harriss et.al. 2004). Democratic 
development has been limited to the dominant economic and political 
groups, their experts and associated leaders of religious and ethnic 
communities. The common view is that only a limited number of resources 
and matters should be subjected to any degree of popular control. The 
growth of democracy is rooted primarily in pact-making amongst the 
dominant groups and a process of similarly elitist institution building, 
both with substantial international support. The views and interests of the 
majority of the population are thereby excluded from the formal political 
arena. Meanwhile there are growing inequalities, privatisation of essential 
public resources to the market as well as to civic, ethnic and religious 
organisations. The public sphere is being hollowed out and the remnants 
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of state and politics are being dominated by the existing political and 
bureaucratic elites. Typically, these elites draw on identity- and money 
politics to retain their positions, while those excluded by basic social and 
economic cleavages are poorly represented by movements, organisations, 
political parties and civic organisations (Harriss et al. 2004, Priyono, et.al. 
2007, Harriss-White 2003 and Nordholt and van Klinken 2007). Civil 
society in terms of associational life among rights bearing citizens is often 
confi ned to middle class activism and self-management (Harriss 2006, 
Lavalle et.al. 2005, Houtzager et. al. 2007, Törnquist 2008).
In view of this third explanation, both the previous arguments are 
insuffi cient.  Better elitist design (as suggested by the proponents of the 
fi rst argument) is not enough to foster the development of movements and 
parties which are needed to bring crucial popular issues and interests on 
the agenda. There are few indications that even the “new local politics” 
based on crafting civil society and inter-personal trust (social capital) 
have developed more comprehensive democracy. Rather, democratic 
development with civil society participation such as in Porto Alegre seems 
to have pended with political facilitation by successful movements, parties, 
politicians and governments (Harriss et.al. 2004).  
Further according to the third explanation, the “sequencing 
of democracy” thesis is both empirically and theoretically mistaken. 
Empirically, there are no attractive blueprints for the “sequencing of 
democracy”. In Europe it took hundreds of years of violent confl icts to 
create the “right” preconditions (Berman 2007, Fukuyama 2007) and in 
the new industrialising states such as South Korea and China the pre-
democracy sequence is marked by harsh repression. Further, most parts 
of the post-colonial world are short of the social, economic and political 
dynamics and actors that resemble those that fi nally generated the various 
brands of the liberal European rechtsstaat and thus economic development 
ahead of democracy. The relative absence of these dynamics seems to call 
instead for even more repression and authoritarian “solutions” than in 
Europe and East Asia (Törnquist 2004).5 
Theoretically, moreover, all proper institutions should ideally of 
course be in place when people gain control of public matters. However, 
if necessary elements of democracy are not included in the defi nition of 
democratic process but deemed external preconditions, there are by 
defi nition nothing but undemocratic ways to generate them. 
This calls for an alternative. While most scholars may agree with 
Beetham (1999) that the aim of democracy is popular control of public 
affairs on the basis of political equality, one must also analyse the various 
means to this end. As elaborated in the second article in this issue of the 
PCD Journal, these means do not need to be advanced enough to, for 
instance, include social and economic justice, but there must be suffi cient 
institutional provisions as well as popular capacities to struggle for political 
equality. With such an approach it is possible to analyse the qualities of 
the essential dimensions and processes at work. This is in contrast to the 
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previous explanations that view democracy as a fi xed organisation and 
focus on imperfect design or unfavourable so-called external conditions.
The primacy of representation
The brief discussion above shifts the attention from elitist crafting 
of liberal democratic institutions only to the wider dynamics of political 
representation. The answer to the crisis of democratisation is, in our 
view, to counter the depoliticisation of democracy by way of more, not 
less, popular infl uence to alter the structure of power and open up for 
alternative processes and agents of democratic change. In general terms, 
we observe that the relatively autonomous political relations between state 
and people have deteriorated (Figure 1). 
Figure 1: The challenges of democratic popular control of public affairs 
In the absence of effective popular control over public affairs, 
economic and political power in countries such as Sri Lanka and Indonesia 
rests primarily with actors related to the state and private businesses. The 
leverage of these dominant actors has increased with the hollowing out of 
the public resources and capacity that were vested with the state. In this 
context, relations between state and people are increasingly mediated on 
the one hand by communal-, patronage- and network based groups and on 
the other by market institutions, neither of which are subject to democratic 
control. The reduction of the public space in favour of, for example, religious 
and ethnic communities is not incompatible with neo-liberal perspectives. 
Rather the communal perspectives are quite in line with the privatisation 
of public resources. The reduction of public social security and education, 
for instance, generate both more communitarian charity and schools 
for the poor and profi table private hospitals and schools for the rich. A 
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basic argument is therefore that the roots of the democratic defi cit is not 
the new and positive civil and political freedoms, but rather that defunct 
instruments and popular capacities to exercise control over public matters 
has made it diffi cult to use the freedoms to alter the relations of power and 
thus improve law, policies and governance. 
If this calls for analyses of the connections between power, confl ict 
and democracy (and in particular the politics of representation), the 
remaining question is how to best go about it. 
First, the problems of democratic political representation are 
universal. It is true that large groups of people abandon politics both in the 
global North and South. But there is an ocean between the remaining public 
resources in the North as compared to the poverty of state capacity in the 
South. Similarly, there is also a major difference between the political exit 
of strong citizens in the North and the marginalisation and subordination 
of vulnerable majorities in the South. Given the particular features of the 
crisis in the South, however, there are remaining lessons to be learnt from 
on the historical development in especially Scandinavia of the roots and 
dynamics of rights based (or social democratic) development, the primacy 
of politics and the linkages between politics and civil society. Moreover, 
there are crucial new experiences in for instance Brazil and South Africa 
from fi ghting similar problems of democracy and popular representation as 
in South and Southeast Asia. 
Second,  the contexts of Sri Lanka and Indonesia open up for 
interesting comparisons and insights by contrasting representatives of 
the fi rst and second paths to democracy – representative cases which 
anyway share many similar problems. The fundamental dilemma in this 
regard is that the availability of sources and the state of knowledge about 
democracy is uneven. While some new surveys have been carried out, 
such as that by the Demos groups in Indonesia and the CSDS reviews in 
South Asia including Sri Lanka, the new data have not been well related 
to either parallel or supplementary data and surveys or to the wide body of 
scattered but often existing case studies. This is a major task for the PCD 
programme. Further, there is a need to identify what factors and dynamics 
that call for supplementary or quite new research – and to facilitate broad 
enough interest and capacity to move ahead.
In these regards we try to learn from the general approach of the 
comprehensive Scandinavian projects on power and democracy, especially 
the most recent one in Norway.6 While these projects had huge funds at 
their disposal, some of their general approaches remain valid. The major 
strategy was to provide chances for interested sections of the relevant 
research community at large to contribute and to combine three tasks: one, 
to review and summarise existing knowledge; two, to carry out a number 
of baseline surveys; three, to add a series of strategic research projects 
on thus identifi ed crucial problems. In addition it was crucial to carry 
out as much as possible of the work and the concluding reports within a 
joint analytical framework. The PCD Programme has added a special effort 
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to promote master and PhD education, both to gain as much input as 
possible from the candidates and to increase the long term capacity. This 
makes it even more important to navigate within a common frame. While 
the details of the programme are in Box 1, the next article in this issue of 
the PCD Journal will address the conceptual challenges at some length.  
Endnotes
1  Early additional partners include the Sri Lankan Social Scientists Association and 
Demos, the Indonesian Center for Democracy and Human Rights Studies.
2  For a broader review and references, see e.g. Törnquist (1999 and 2004). 
3  This section draws on parts of Törnquist’s fi rst chapter in the forthcoming 
anthology Törnquist (2009) – which in turn has benefi tted extensively from several 
of the leading projects in the PCD Programme. 
4  The term ‘governance’ is usually inclusive of wider forms of government of a society 
than those which refer to the hierarchically organised systems of government. 
Hence ‘good governance’ does not presume democracy by way of a constitutional 
chain of popular command but is open for other systems of ‘public management’ 
and rather focus on problems of corruption, accountability, effectiveness and 
effi ciency.
5 Meanwhile the attempts by Muslims, Hindus and others to promote supposedly 
less repressive and commercial communal values tend to undermine civil and 
political equality and to sustain clientelism (Törnquist 2007b). Besides, the 
unfavourable religious and ethnic identities or cultures of political patronage and 
clientelism, which the proponents of long processes of reform ahead of democracy 
use to emphasise, are rarely as deeply rooted and stable as is generally assumed. 
These practices are often rather contemporary political reinterpretations of former 
cultural and social systems, as exemplifi ed by the case of Hindu fundamentalism 
in India (Corbridge and Harriss 2000, Blom-Hansen 1999) or the idea of ‘Asian 
values’ which crumbled with regimes such as that of Suharto (Priyono et.al. 2007). 
6  For a summary of the major conclusions, see Østerud (2005)
Introducing the Power, Confl ict and Democracy Programme
10
Box. 1 Details of the PCD Programme
11
PCD Journal Vol. 1, No. 1 & 2
References
Beetham, D 1999, Democracy and human rights, Polity Press, Oxford.
Berman, S  2007, ‘The vain hope for ”correct” timing’, Journal of Democracy, 
vol.18, no 3.
Catón, M 2007, ‘Effective party assistance: stronger party for better 
democracy’, IDEA Policy Paper, Stockholm.
Carothers, T 2007a, ‘How democracies emerge. The “sequencing” fallacy’, 
Journal of Democracy, vol.18, no1.
 Carothers, T 2007b, ‘Misunderstanding gradualism’, Journal of Democracy, 
vol.18 no.3.
Corbridge, S and Harriss, J 2000, Reinventing India: liberalization, Hindu 
nationalism and popular democracy, Polity Press, Oxford.
Centre for the Study of Developing Societies 2007, State of democracy in 
South Asia, Oxford University Press, New Delhi.
Fukuyama, F 2007, ‘Liberalism versus state-building’,  Journal of 
Democracy, vol. 18, no.3.
Harriss, J 2006, ‘Politics is a dirty river”. But is there a “new politics” of 
civil society?’, in J Harriss,  Power matters: essays on institutions, 
politics and society in India, Oxford University Press, New Delhi.
Harriss, J, Stokke, K and Törnquist, O (eds.) 2004. Politicising democracy. 
The new local politics of democratisation, Palgrave Macmillan, 
Houndmills.
Harris-White, B 2003, India working: essays on society and economy. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Houtzager, P. P, Acharya, A and Gurza Lavalle, A 2007, Associations and 
the exercise of citizenship in new democracies: evidence from São 
Paulo and Mexico City, IDS Working Paper 285, University of 
Sussex, Brighton.
Huntington, S. P 1965, ‘Political development and political decay’ World 
Politics, vol.17, no.3.
Khan, M. H 2005, ‘Markets, states and democracy: patron-client 
networks and the case for democracy in developing countries’, 
Democratization, vol.12, no. 5. 
Lavalle, A. G, A. Acharya and P.P. Houtzager 2005, ‘Beyond comparative 
anecdotalism: lessons on civil society and participation form São 
Paulo, Brazil’, World Development, vol. 33, no.6, pp. 951-964.
Mansfi eld, Edward, D and Snyder, J 2005, Electing to fi ght: Why democracies 
go to war, MIT Press, Cambridge.
Nordholt, H. S and van Klinken, G (eds.) 2007. Renegotiating boundaries: 
local politics in post-Suharto Indonesia, KITLV Press, Leiden.
Paris, R 2004, At war’s end. Building peace after civil confl ict, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge.
Priyono, A.E,  Samadhi, W. P, and Törnquist, O 2007 (eds.). Making 
democracy meaningful. Problems and options in Indonesia, PCD 
Press, Demos and ISEAS, Jogjakarta, Jakarta and Singapore.
Introducing the Power, Confl ict and Democracy Programme
12
Törnquist, O 1999, Politics and development. A critical introduction, 
Thousand Oaks and New Delhi, London and India. 
Törnquist, O 2004, ‘The political  defi cit of substantial democratisation’, 
in  Harriss, J, Stokke, K and Törnquist, O (eds.), Politicising 
democracy. The new local politics of democratisation, Palgrave 
Macmillan, Houndmills.
Törnquist, O 2007b, ‘Muslim politics and democracy: the case of Indonesia,’ 
Journal of Indonesian Islam, vol. 1, no. 1.
Törnquist, O 2008, ‘Civic action and defi cit democracy’ (forthcoming) in 
Selle, P. and Prakash, S (eds.), Beyond civil society, Routledge, 
London and New York. 
Törnquist, O (forthcoming), ‘The problem is representation! Towards an 
analytical framework’, in Törnquist, O, Stokke, K and Webster, 
N (eds.), Rethinking popular representation, Palgrave Macmillan, 
Houndmills.
UNDP 2002, Human development report: deepening democracy in a 
Fragmented World, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford.
 World Bank 1997, World development report 1997: the state in a changing 
world, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Østerud, Ø (ed.) 2005. ‘Special issue on Norway: the transformation of a 
political system’, West European Politics, vol. 28, no. 4. 
